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Policy debates around local economic development (LED) are mainly focussed on the role of sub-
national levels of government. Limited attention is given to the appropriate role of central or national 
government. Nevertheless, an important set of functions can be assumed by national governments in 
support of LED programming, not least in furnishing a coherent framework and guidelines for local 
planning affecting business development. The aim of this article is to offer a critical synthesis of 
international experience, mainly from OECD countries, concerning the roles played by national 
government in support of organizing LED initiatives. From international experience, twelve different 
roles can be discerned. In Africa, the most fundamental in energizing LED processes are improving the 
national business environment, reviewing national regulatory processes that impede local development 
initiatives, appropriate support for small business development, enhancing coordination across 
different government departments, and strengthening the competiveness of cities. 
 





As emphasized by Clark (2008: 107), local economic 
development “is now fully part of the mainstream appa-
ratus of policy for driving economic performance”. The 
contours of development planning affecting business 
development have been radically transformed in the 
context of globalization (Pike et al., 2006; Christensen 
and van der Ree, 2008; Rodriguez-Pose, 2008a, b). In 
particular, the importance of local level planning for 
economic and social development is much enhanced. 
The International Labour Organization (ILO, 2006: 2) 
asserts that local economies are affected more than ever 
before “by policies and processes formed at the 
supranational level, such as market liberalisation, 
expanding global production systems and the changing 
terms of trade”. The main body of current LED knowledge 
is derived particularly from European and Latin American 
experiences (Van Empel 2008). In Africa, Helmsing and 
Egziabher (2005:1) consider LED to be “a process in 
which partnerships between local governments, NGOs, 
community-based groups and the private sector are 
established to manage existing resources, to create jobs 
and stimulate the economy of a well-defined territory”.  
For other analysts, in the absence of a clearly defined 
theoretical model, it is contended “LED strategies tend to 
resort to the basic features of the approach to specify 
their content” (Rodriguez-Pose, 2001: 8). The ILO 
distinguishes four core features that characterize LED 
strategies: (1) participation and social dialogue; (2) a 
focus on territory; (3) the mobilization of local resources 
and competitive advantages; and, (4) the imperative for 
high levels of local ownership and management. These 
four characteristics are brought together in its particular 
definition of LED as a “participatory development process 
that encourages partnership arrangements between the 
main private and public stakeholders of a defined 
territory, enabling the joint design and implementation of 
a common development strategy, by making use of the 
local resources and competitive advantage in a global 
context, with the final objective of creating decent jobs 
and stimulating economic activity” (ILO, 2006: 2).   
Certainly, the major emphasis in policy debates and 
writings on Local Economic Development is about the 
role of sub-national levels of government in the promotion 




central or national government, there exist an important 
set of functions that national governments can perform in 
support of LED programming, not least in providing a 
framework and guidelines for local planning (Rogerson, 
2008). The development of guidelines to local govern-
ments has been the prime role of national government in 
South Africa, the country with the most advanced 
programme of local planning in Africa (Nel and Rogerson, 
2005; Rogerson, 2010). The aim of this article is to offer a 
critical analysis of international experience concerning 
the roles played by national government in support of or 
organizing LED initiatives. Methodologically, an analysis 
of material was undertaken which focussed largely upon 
the experience of the OECD group of countries where 
planning programmes for LED linked to enterprise deve-
lopment are well-established. Although it is cautioned that 
these policy roles drawn from the experience of the 
Global North cannot necessarily be replicated in the con-
text of sub-Saharan Africa, none the less, they provide a 
baseline against which emerging LED experience across 
Africa can be benchmarked. The discussion unfolds 
through two uneven sections of discussion. The first 
clarifies the rationale for the adoption of LED approaches 
to development planning. The second isolates twelve 
potential roles for national governments in affording 
greater leadership, direction and support to LED planning 
initiatives which might be undertaken by sub-national 
tiers of government. 
 
 
WHY LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT? 
 
From a review of international experience, there are 
several distinct different approaches to LED as well as 
different entry points for starting a LED process (Pike et 
al., 2006, 2007). LED processes offer an integrated 
approach to development rather than a ‘one size fits all’ 
solution. It is stressed that the core purpose is “to mo-
bilise the local economic potential by bringing innovation 
to all its growth dimensions which range from infrastruc-
ture, to local SMEs and their skills, to attracting foreign 
direct investment, fostering territorial competitive-ness, 
strengthening local institutions, better management of the 
development process and internalising local re-sources” 
(Rodriguez-Pose, 2008b: 23). Bringing together local 
governments, the private sector and civil society in a 
search for the right LED formula “allows the community to 
build from the ‘inside-out’, capitalizing on local assets 
rather than from the ‘outside-in’ relying on external 
interventions” (ILO, 2008: 2).  
It is observed that one of the major features of glo-
balisation “is that markets have become more pervasive 
and are affecting countries simultaneously across the 
world” (Christensen and van der Ree, 2008: 2). The ILO 
argues that local economies are currently impacted more 
than ever before “by policies and processes formed at the 
supranational   level,   such    as    market    liberalisation,  




expanding global production systems and the changing 
terms of trade” (ILO, 2006: 2). LED “offers a means to 
counteract, or take advantage of the forces of globa-
lisation by maximising local potentials” (ILO, 2006: 2). 
Amidst current circumstances of global economic turmoil, 
localities are compelled to seek out new solutions in 
support of local competitiveness as well as to create 
inclusive development (ILO, 2008). For some observers, 
the key contemporary challenge facing all of LED is “how 
to make the most of local resources in a way that 
improves returns from global markets” (Christensen and 
van der Ree, 2008: 2). 
The developmental challenges posed by globalization 
have precipitated a serious re-thinking of the validity of 
former approaches to development planning (Pike et al., 
2006). The major differences between LED and tradi-
tional top-down approaches to development planning are 
summarized in Table 1 and relate to five domains 
(Rodriguez-Pose, 2001, 2008a): 
 
1. Whereas in traditional top-down approaches the 
decision on where to implement development strategies 
is taken by central  government planners and developers, 
with little or no involvement of local actors, LED practices 
favour the promotion of development in all territories by 
using the economic potential and the competitive 
advantage of every space. The initiative to launch the 
development strategy is taken locally or with strong local 
support.  
2. As a result of where and how the decisions are taken, 
traditional policies have been generally designed, 
managed, and implemented by ministries or central 
government agencies. The involvement of local actors in 
LED strategies implies, in contrast, a much greater 
degree of vertical and horizontal coordination of all the 
actors involved. Vertical coordination entails the synchro-
nization of local, regional, national and supranational or 
international institutions. Horizontal coordination 
comprises local public and private actors concerned with 
development issues (Table 1). 
3. This is the approach to ‘doing’ development. Tradi-
tional policies tended to adopt a sectoral approach. The 
promotion of specific industrial sectors that contribute to 
generate economic dynamism has been one of the main 
objectives of these policies. By contrast, LED uses a 
territorial approach as a means of achieving economic 
development. The diagnosis of the economic, social, and 
institutional conditions of every territory and the 
identification of the local economic potential are the 
foundations upon which a local development strategy is 
constructed.  
4. Closely allied to the sectoral approach of most 
traditional development policies is the development of 
large industrial projects that were expected to promote 
additional economic activity and generate the networks 
and value chains needed in order to achieve sustainable 
development.  The  problems  of   this   type   of   practice 




Table 1. Main differences between traditional top-down development policies and bottom-up LED approaches. 
  
Traditional development policies Local economic development 
Top-down approach in which decisions about the areas where 
intervention is needed are taken in the centre 
Promotion of development in all territories with the initiative 
often coming from below 
  
Managed by the central administration Decentralized, vertical cooperation between different tiers of 
government and horizontal cooperation between public and 
private bodies 
  
Sectoral approach to development Territorial approach to development (locality, milieu) 
  
Development of large industrial projects to stimulate other 
economic activity 
Maximising the development potential of each area to 
stimulate a progressive adjustment of the local economic 
system to the changing economic environment 
  
Financial support, incentives and subsidies as the main factor for 
attracting economic activity 
Provision of key conditions for the development of economic 
activity 
 




encouraged LED practitioners to identify and use the 
economic development potential of each area and to sti-
mulate the progressive adjustment of the local economic 
system to changing economic conditions (Rodriguez-
Pose, 2001). 
5. Both approaches are set apart by their way of 
attracting economic activity. While traditional approaches 
rely on often national government supported financial 
support, incentive packages and subsidies in order to 
attract and maintain economic activity, LED tends often to 
shun such activities and concentrate on improvement of 
the basic conditions in the locality for the development 
and attraction of further economic activity (Rodriguez-
Pose, 2001). 
 
In a globalized world, Rodriguez-Pose (2001, 2008a, b) 
identifies numerous advantages related to the adoption of 
LED strategies as compared to traditional development 
programmes. These advantages are economic and 
social. The key social advantages are that LED strategies 
empower local societies and generate local dialogue and 
that LED strategies should assist in making local institu-
tions more transparent and accountable, thus contributing 
to the development of local civil society. The economic 
advantages of the approach of LED perhaps are the most 
significant. First, LED strategies seek to embed economic 
activity in a territory and make economic activity 
dependent on the specific economic conditions and 
comparative advantages of that place; they generate 
sustainable employment in enterprises more capable to 
withstand changes in the global economic environment. 
Second, as a consequence of the involvement of local 
stakeholders and the rooting of economic activity in a 
territory, LED strategies can also contribute towards a 
general improvement  in  the  quality  of  jobs  or  in  other  
words, towards the ILO (2008) goal of ‘decent work’.  
LED planning approaches are distinguished most 
radically from traditional development approaches in their 
focus on a defined territory (ILO, 2008; Rodriguez-Pose, 
2008a). What links the different approaches together “is 
the common concern for making local economies robust 
and creating productive jobs and incomes for local 
populations and also the recognition that local or regional 
competitive advantage rests on local interactions, 
knowledge spillovers and institutional synergies” 
(Salazar-Xirinachs, 2008: v). Although the activity of LED 
embodies a clear economic focus, it is not simply about 
economic growth, instead, it should be targeted at “a 
sustainable development pattern which accommodates 
and reconciles economic, social and ecological issues 
and objectives” (Ruecker and Trah, 2007: 15).  
 
 
DEFINING APPROPRIATE ROLES FOR NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENTS   
 
An analysis of international experience discloses an array 
of differing ways that national governments can intervene 
and support local economic development initiatives. In 
total, at least 12 different roles can be identified. 
 
 
Improve the national business environment 
 
Improving local business environments in order to 
provide more favourable conditions for ‘doing business’ 
by the private sector is one of focal points for LED plan-
ning (World Bank, 2004, 2010a). In recent years, “donors 
and governments in developing and transition countries 




environment for business as a means of promoting enter-
prise development and through it, of growing their eco-
nomies, increasing employment, improving welfare and 
reducing poverty” (Hindson and Meyer-Stamer, 2007: 1). 
For Kaufmann et al. (2007: 2), enhancing the business 
and investment climate “has become an important topic 
in the international discourse on private sector develop-
ment”.   
In the developing world, research into the business 
environment disclosed that developing countries are 
challenged by poor public governance, weak 
infrastructure and policy, and legal frameworks that are 
inconsistent, unstable and unpredictable (DFID ICEE 
Team et al., 2004: 10). The simplification of business 
registration procedures coupled with reform of labour 
regulations and property titling are highlighted as core 
elements for creating a conducive business environment 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa (UNIDO and GTZ, 
2008). Reducing regulatory costs and enhancing regula-
tory efficiency are considered “the most practical and 
effective means of encouraging enterprise development” 
(Bannock and Darroll, 2007: 2). Several studies disclose 
that the development prospects of small, medium and 
micro enterprise (SMME) are constrained by unfavour-
able economic governance conditions that can include 
non-transparent, time-consuming and costly bureaucratic 
procedures; outdated laws and regulations for business 
transactions, and a high level of corruption (Kaufmann et 
al., 2007: 2). In most contexts, the existing business 
environment is biased towards larger formal enterprises 
to the disadvantage of small and medium enterprises and 
“more so, of the very small informal enterprises of the 
very poor” (Chen, 2005: 2).  
Business environment conditions affect firm decisions 
and performance (Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido, 2007). 
At the firm level, the business environment directly 
influences costs of production and at the industry level 
often relates to market structure and competition. It is 
argued that the impact of the business environment is 
experienced more heavily in traded sectors that are not 
particularly intensive in natural resources (that is, 
manufacturing or services) rather than in primary 
production and extractive resource sectors as the “former 
tend to more intensively require ‘inputs’ of logistics, 
infrastructure and regulation” (Eifert et al., 2005: 7). As 
shown by Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido (2007), the 
business environment in which firms operate can 
influence the size distribution of firms. The continent of 
Africa is described as containing “most of the world’s 
least business-friendly regulatory environments” 
(Bannock and Darroll, 2007: 3). Generic business climate 
reforms are viewed as affecting all firms or enterprises 
and “are thus claimed to induce improvements with broad 
social outreach” (UNIDO and GTZ, 2008: 2). World Bank 
research (2010a, b) on business environment reform 
recommends the pursuit of local reforms for improving 
the   ‘local   business   environment’   for   private    sector  




development, particularly concerning the need for 
transparent business regulations. It is argued that “where 
regulation is burdensome and competition limited, 
success tends to depend on whom you know rather than 
on what you can do” (World Bank, 2010b: vii). Neverthe-
less, with transparent business regulations “opportunities 
are less likely to be based on personal connections or 
special privileges and more activity is likely to take place 
in the formal economy” (World Bank, 2010a: 2). 
According to the World Bank (2002), enhancing the 
investment climate is about better public policy for the 
private sector, including the required supporting institu-
tions. Critical features of a sound investment climate 
encompass a sound economic governance system that 
allows enterprises to pursue productive activity without 
harassment, respect for contracts and property rights, 
and reduction in corruption. Other vital elements are a 
sound financial sector and a stable macro-economic 
environment. Of equal importance is the making of an 
infrastructure that facilitates effective operation by the 
private sector. The quality and quantity of available phy-
sical and financial infrastructure, such as power, transport 
and telecommunications, and banking and finance are 
key determinants of competitiveness and enterprise pro-
fitability. The challenge for national government is thus to 
enhance by all means possible, the investment climate as 
an enabling framework for local development activities by 
sub-national agencies and local governments, a chal-
lenge which has been recognized in LED interventions in 
South Africa (Rogerson and Rogerson, 2011). 
 
 
Champion place and the understanding of spatial 
policies 
 
A second potential role for departments or ministries in 
national government is to function as champions of 
‘place’ and of locality-based development and to enhance 
understanding of the importance of spatial planning. In 
the United Kingdom, for example, a central role which is 
shared between the Department for Communities and 
Local Government and the Department for Business 
Enterprises and Regulatory Reform is responsibility for 
policies having clear spatial objectives as well as for 
encouraging other departments to recognize the spatial 
impacts (intended or unintended) of their policies. Put 
simply, a major responsibility is concern about spatial 
disparities and the impacts (positive and negative) that 
place can have both on people and businesses in terms 
of opportunities. A growing body of research shows that 
spatial disparities can be efficient and may not even be 
inequitable from a welfare perspective. Indeed, it must be 
understood that spatial inequalities are often the spatial 
manifestation of non-spatial policies or processes. 
Accordingly, “even if there is a need for government 
intervention, the appropriate policy response is not 
necessarily  spatial”  (Department  for  Communities   and  




Local Government, 2007: 34). 
It is argued that the introduction of spatial policies can 
be justified in relation to three basic rationales for inter-
vention, namely efficiency, equity and environment. The 
experience of the United Kingdom is that an efficiency 
rationale depends upon identifying either market or 
government failures in the forces which drive the spatial 
distribution of economic activity or which interact with the 
characteristics of places such as to undermine economic 
performance. The 2009 World Bank World Development 
Report offers the key message that economic develop-
ment inevitably will be geographically uneven and that to 
introduce or continue with policies which are designed to 
spread out economic activities – spatially or across the 
national urban system - carries with it the inherent danger 
that economic growth may be discouraged or arrested 
(World Bank, 2009).  That said, the report asserts 
“development can still be inclusive, in that even people 
who start their lives far away from economic opportunity 
can benefit from the growing concentration of wealth in a 
few places” (World Bank, 2009: xxi). The Report is highly 
critical of the heavy focus of policy-makers in searching 
for ‘spatially balanced development’, which was a popular 
goal in several national urban development policies 
(World Bank, 2009: 73). The essential parameters for 
achieving inclusive development are spelled out as 
follows: “With good policies, the concentration of econo-
mic activity and the convergence of living standards can 
happen together. The challenge for governments is to 
allow – even encourage – “unbalanced” economic 
growth, and yet ensure inclusive development. They can 
do this through economic integration – by bringing 
laggard and leading places closer in economic terms” 
(World Bank, 2009: 20).  It is explained that this 
integration can most appropriately be undertaken “by 
unleashing the market forces of agglomeration, migration 
and specialization, not by fighting and opposing them” 
(World Bank, 2009: 21).  
In line with the World Bank’s analysis, in the UK, it is 
acknowledged that as businesses gain agglomeration 
effects or external scale economies from clustering toge-
ther, an uneven spatial distribution is likely to be efficient 
and that differences in GVA per capita across places do 
not reflect market failures (Department for Communities 
and Local Government, 2007: 34). Aspects of market 
failure which undermine overall economic performance 
and standards of living can result in either too much 
concentration of economic activities whereas others 
undermine efficient agglomeration. For example, people 
and firms do not take into account the impact of their 
location decisions on others. It is pointed out firms will not 
take into account the ‘knowledge spillover’ benefits of 
their innovation for nearby firms or the impact they have 
on congestion. These are ‘offsetting externalities’ which 
can mean that cities could be either too big or too small 
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 





In addition to an efficiency rationale for introducing 
spatial policies, a second basis is an equity rationale 
which “depends upon identifying ways in which place is 
impacting on people’s opportunities or outcomes or if 
people are prevented from taking advantage of opportu-
nities in other places” (Department for Communities and 
Local Government, 2007: 21). It is critical that national 
government appreciate that uneven spatial outcomes are 
not sufficient by themselves to justify government inter-
vention on equity grounds. Indeed, it is argued national 
government needs to “understand the economic 
mechanisms that are leading to uneven development and 
the impact that has on the people who live in those 
places. Overall, it is considered that “an equity rationale 
for intervention is appropriate if we can identify evidence 
that the characteristics of places – as distinct from the 
characteristics of the people who live there – impact on 
economic and social outcomes, or if particular groups find 
it difficult to move in response to changes in the 
economic viability of their local areas” (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2007: 30). 
The final grounds for applying spatial policies are an 
environmental rationale. This depends upon understan-
ding and identifying the environmental implications of 
spatial disparities or market failures or equity issues in 
the development and use of place-specific environmental 
assets. It is important for national government to 
strengthen its understanding of the environmental 
impacts of the distribution of economic activities. Overall, 
given the complexity of developing spatial policies, it is 
critical for one national government department to 
assume a lead role in relation to understanding the 
spatial economy, spatial disparities and for monitoring 
spatial policies.  
 
 
Relax national regulations that unnecessarily impede 
local economic development programmes 
 
In many countries, there exist a host of regulations 
introduced by national governments which can reduce 
the ability of sub-national tiers of governments to 
conduct, or innovate programmes for local economic 
development. The argument is made that national 
governments should conduct an audit of their own 
regulatory regimes with a view to allowing sub-national 
governments a greater measure of flexibility in 
implementing LED programmes. This option is especially 
important in times of economic recession when limitations 
exist upon national government support funding for sub-
national initiatives for local development. The position is 
argued that the least national governments can do is not 
get in the way of creative local economic development 
strategies. The recommendation is therefore that a 
performance review be undertaken as a first step towards 
the relaxation of existing regulations imposed by national 




activities of sub-national tiers of government. 
 
 
Improve Understanding of Local and Sub-national 
Economies 
 
A critical role for national government in relation to local 
and regional economies is to assist in improved under-
standing of local economies. Illustratively, this issue has 
recently been taken up by the Department for Com-
munities and Local Government and the Department for 
Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform in the United 
Kingdom. Here, it is considered a better understanding of 
how local economic activity links with the wider economy 
can lead to the development of more effective economic 
development policies at sub-regional and local levels. 
Central government has intervened with the objective of 
ensuring that “local authorities and their partners develop 
a sound understanding of local economic conditions to 
inform existing local strategies and strengthen the 
economic role of local authorities” (Department for Com-
munities and Local Government and the Department for 
Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2008a: 48). 
As part of the 2007 review of sub-national economic 
development and regeneration in the United Kingdom, 
central government imposed a duty on local authorities in 
consultation with their partners to carry out an assess-
ment of economic conditions in their local area. The 
central government believes that this new responsibility 
for local authorities would add considerable benefit to 
existing practices, inter alia, providing an improved 
evidence base for planning; improving understanding of 
how economic development can support regeneration; 
analyze the ways in which local areas fit into wider sub-
regional and regional markets; and, establishment of a 
shared evidence base to support sub-regional economic 
development activities. 
The rationale for encouraging such local economic 
assessments is as follows. It is stated that “a publicly 
available assessment of the local economy will help 
public bodies, private and third sector organizations to 
understand the way in which places impact on firms’ 
productivity and what barriers may be holding back 
economic growth” (Department for Communities and 
Local Government and the Department for Business 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2008a: 53). Further-
more, a good assessment that helps local authorities 
understand the way that local economic activities link with 
the wider economy may function to enable cross-boun-
dary cooperation and working together by different local 
and regional authorities (Department for Communities 
and Local Government and the Department for Business 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2008a: 57).  
Improving local assessments can have additional 
benefits. Other advantages are that it would “help inform 
local government and others about what public infras-
tructure will be required to cope with or catalyze  changes  




in an area’s economy” (Department for Communities and 
Local Government and the Department for Business 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2008a: 53). Further, 
“by ensuring that existing strategies are firmly grounded 
in an area’s economy, the duty will help reduce 
uncertainty about future public sector activity, thus 
benefiting the investment decisions of the private sector” 
(Department for Communities and Local Government and 
the Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform, 2008a: 53). 
  
  
Moderate inter-state and inter-city competition 
  
The application of local incentives, subsidies or tax 
deductions was an essential element of so-termed ‘tradi-
tional’ local economic development planning (Bradshaw 
and Blakely 1999; Bartik, 2003). For the USA, Peters and 
Fischer (2004: 27) record a history of 30 years of 
provision of business incentives by state and local autho-
rities as “mainstays of economic development policy”. 
Although LED planning approaches have shifted away 
over the past two decades towards building a knowledge 
infrastructure base necessary for a competitive local 
economy, elements of the ‘traditional approach’ clearly 
persist. Markusen and Nesse (2007: 4) assert in the 
USA, “the evidence is fairly strong that incentive compe-
tition has increased since the 1960s”. In 1995, it was 
observed that state and local competition in the USA for 
business expansions and new plants “has grown fierce” 
(Bartik, 1995).  
Considerable controversy surrounds the offers of invest-
ment incentives by the sub-national tier of government to 
attract new inward investment or retain existing investors. 
In particular, there is debate between two competing 
viewpoints of analysis (Charlton, 2003; Markusen and 
Nesse, 2007). On the one hand  are the proponents of 
incentives who subscribe to the ‘positive sum hypothesis’ 
and contend either that incentives are the efficient 
manifestation of competitive markets or the ‘second best’ 
form of government intervention designed to achieve 
legitimate industrial policy objectives (Charlton, 2003). On 
the other hand, critics of incentives believe competition 
for investment is simply a ‘negative-sum game’ which 
causes a ‘race to the bottom’ as different jurisdictions 
‘over-bid’ for the right to host particular investors 
(Charlton, 2003: 13). In addition, competitive bidding is 
considered as diverting funds away from other necessary 
LED activities which might yield a higher overall return in 
terms of economic growth and welfare (Bradshaw and 
Blakely, 1999; Bartik, 2004). Much negative commentary 
surrounds the notions of ‘investment poaching’ or ‘beggar 
thy neighbour’ impacts of investment incentives. It is 
within this context of the dangers associated with ‘zero-
sum game’ dimensions of state and local competition for 
business as part of LED programming that an important 
role  is  identified  for  national  governments,  namely   to  




moderate inter-locality competition (Thomas, 2010).  
  
 
Assume role of effective coordinator 
 
Another critical role that can be assumed by national 
government for supporting LED is as  effective 
coordinator between different operational policies either 
of different national departments or different tiers of 
government (Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2007: 35). As the design and implementa-
tion of economic development strategies must occur at all 
spatial scales, there is a critical responsibility for national 
government to assume a leadership role for coordination 
across different scales. It is argued, at least from the 
experience of the United Kingdom, that policy coherence 
may be hard to achieve when decisions are taken at 
different spatial levels of government. This creates an 
imperative for “joined-up” thinking across government in 
support of LED programmes. Moreover, as policies come 
together in places “so there is a need to join up and 
coordinate delivery of different policies in particular 
places” (Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2007: 35).  
Overall, in the United Kingdom, it is acknowledged there 
is a need for “flexibility and co-operation to ensure econo-
mic strategies for different levels complement each other” 
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 
2008: 34). The imperative for policy coordination applies 
with regard to both vertical policy linkages (that is, 
between lower and higher levels of government) and 
horizontal linkages (between agencies or levels of 
government at the same spatial scale) (Department for 
Communities and Local Government 2008). The recent 
extended review in the United Kingdom of sub-national 
economic development and regeneration, published in 
2007, asserts firmly that central government must 
assume responsibility “to support better coordination at 
all levels” (Department for Communities and Local 
Government and Department for Business Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform, 2008a: 2). 
 
 
Encourage and support sub-regional cooperation 
 
An essential sub-text of the 2007 United Kingdom review 
was that national government would act to facilitate and 
support effective collaboration between local authorities 
across different functioning economic areas (Department 
for Communities and Local Government and the 
Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform, 2007: 3). The sub-national review conceded that 
current administrative boundaries rarely captured 
cohesive functional economic areas. Accordingly, “the 
need for effective collaboration between local authorities 
is clear” (Department for Communities and Local 





Regulatory Reform, 2008b: 12).  
The relevant national departments in the United 
Kingdom enacted a number of measures aimed at 
supporting collaboration between sub-national authorities 
regarding economic development. In order to strengthen 
existing collaboration and to foster new partnerships 
national government legislated the creation of statutory 
sub-regional authorities known as Economic Improve-
ment Boards, the core purpose of which are “to improve 
economic development in the area covered and the 
overall economic conditions of the sub-region” 
(Department for Communities and Local Government and 
Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform, 2008b: 13). Another institutional innovation in 
order to increase the range of options for collaboration is 
legislation to encourage multi-area agreements which 
draw together local areas to focus on those “economic 
issues which most affect them and to work in collabo-
ration to address real economic challenges” (Department 
for Communities and Local Government and Department 
for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2008b: 
7).  Further, the OECD (2006) contends higher levels of 
government “are central to building metropolitan 
cooperation” for building competitiveness. National 
governments are seen as playing a critical leadership role 
in imposing or encouraging reform in order to create 
variously merged municipalities within a city region, 




Direct intervention to provide key economic 
development inputs in which national government 
has a comparative advantage over sub-national tiers 
of government 
 
It is recognised that many inputs for economic 
development, such as training or business information, 
are best provided at sub-national or local tiers. By 
contrast, other inputs for economic development are most 
appropriately provided by a higher level of government 
because of economies of scale. From the experience of 
the USA, for example, Bartik (1994: 16) suggests that 
federal government can play a valuable role “in providing 
information on foreign markets and export opportunities”. 
Involvement by national government captures economies 
of scale as compared to each state doing its own 
research as federal government has an existing and 
extensive network of embassies and consulates around 
the world which can gather information on trade 
opportunities. It is argued that the federal government 
should focus on collecting and analysing such information 
and delivering the information to individual enterprises or 
sub-national organizations through a network of local 
organizations. Other areas for Federal government 
intervention in the USA are identified for expanding the 




technology support and development (Bartik 1994). 
In the United Kingdom, there is a similar argument on a 
role for national government. It has been argued that in 
relation to sub-national economic development that there 
are “benefits of delivering national policies which derive 
from exploiting economies of scale and scope” 
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 
2007: 35). More especially, it is evident that higher levels 
of government enjoy cost savings from delivering large 
volumes of public goods and services or have better 
access to specialised staff or knowledge of best practice 
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 
2007: 35). Economies of scale occur in circumstances 
where national government can enjoy lower average 
costs from delivering large volumes of public goods or 
services such as in the delivery of “large infrastructure 
projects or in economic development policies with large 
upfront costs” (Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2008: 33). Furthermore, it is pointed out 
that “policy development at a higher spatial level can also 
allow the profile of a particular policy or programme to be 
raised” (Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2008: 33).  
By contrast, economies of scope occur when different 
levels of government can realise cost savings by expan-
ding the number of activities where combining activities 
reduces overall cost. In some areas of policy 
development national government may have access to 
specialised staff which can undertake higher quality 
policy analysis. In other policy areas, there may be 
significant risks that separate policies produced by each 
locality “would create confusion or distort decision-
making” (Department for Communities and Local Govern-
ment, 2008: 34). Finally, it is recognised that economies 
of scope can accrue with respect to information collec-
tion. Overall, it is cautioned that whilst “local officials will 
often have a much better understanding of local 
conditions, they may not match that with good 
understanding of the wider national framework and best 
practices” (Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2008: 34). 
 
 
Defining an appropriate role for supporting small 
business development 
 
The international experience reveals that national 
departments of government which are concerned with 
economic development must take a leadership role in 
terms of support programming for small business deve-
lopment. It is apparent from a range of different OECD 
countries that national departments assume a vital role in 
defining and leading policy interventions and 
programming for expanding the role of small businesses 
in national economic development (OECD, 2006). 
The ‘best practice’ for national governments in sup-
porting  small   enterprise   development   has   been   the  




subject of much controversy and of changes in viewpoint, 
especially over the past 25 years. From the 1970s, 
national governments began to subsidize the delivery of 
SMME support services of various kinds, including credit 
and of Business Development Services (BDS) such as 
business and technical training or assistance with 
identifying and accessing new markets (Dawson, 1997).  In 
particular, enterprise promotion efforts in developing 
countries were mostly based on the belief that the small 
entrepreneur was an individual that required continuous 
subsidisation by governments in the form of free training, 
ready-made feasibility studies, purpose-built industrial 
estates, marketing assistance, credit, below-market interest 
rates and continuous advice. Although large institutions 
were established to ensure that subsidies went to small 
entrepreneurs, often these subsidies were captured for the 
benefit of more powerful groups with the result that only 
limited benefits actually accrued to the poor (Dawson, 
1997). Moreover, the targeted entrepreneurs represented 
only a small fraction of the total population of entrepreneurs 
in any country.  
Overall, the record of international experience of 
government-led provision of BDS services is viewed in 
somewhat negative light. Out of the international dis-
appointments and learning associated with government-led 
provision of BDS, occurred a ‘paradigm shift’ in BDS 
support provision. At its heart, the market development 
approach focuses upon the development of effective 
markets for private sector providers to offer services in 
order to help SMMEs upgrade and compete (Bear et al., 
2003; Waltring, 2006). This approach to BDS is founded 
upon the fundamental belief in private sector markets as 
engines of growth and as efficient suppliers of goods and 
services. In terms of application, the approach starts by 
understanding both the existing supply of BDS from the 
private sector, donor-supported programmes and by 
government and identifies “market failures” that can result 
in a gap between the supply and demand for services. 
Correspondingly, the purpose of market development 
interventions is to overcome these market failures and 
take advantage of opportunities to expand the service 
market for SMMEs (Miehlbradt, 2002). The desired out-
come is for a large proportion of SMMEs to buy the BDS 
of their choice from a wide selection of products offered 
(primarily) by unsubsidized private sector suppliers in a 
competitive and evolving market (Miehlbradt and McVay, 
2003a, b).  
Bear et al. (2003) maintain there is “a widely prevailing 
misconception” that the new support paradigm is anti-
government. For Hitchins (2002: 1), “the view is that 
publicly-funded development assistance is better used to 
promote markets for services – markets which ensure 
that a diversity of appropriate services can be developed 
and provided to SMEs, driven by their demand and 
shaped by competition”. Nevertheless, it is stressed that 
it is incorrect to assume that national government has no 
role to play in BDS; rather, “the more realistic view is  that  




government almost certainly will have a role, but that this 
role may differ considerably from conventional roles” 
(Hitchins, 2002:  1). In the guidelines of the Committee of 
Donor Agencies for Small Enterprise Development 
(2001), it is envisaged that national government’s core 
function shifts from direct provider of services to regulator 
or facilitator of business service markets. As a whole, it is 
viewed that the core requirements for facilitation are “the 
capability of undertaking the requisite analysis to identify 
market constraints and the flexibility to develop interven-
tions to respond to these constraints and engage with a 
range of possible market players” (Hitchins, 2002: 4). In 
the final analysis, it is suggested that the approach of 
BDS market development is pro-government in terms of 
governments playing a more appropriate role fitting its 
core competence as provider of public goods. Such roles 
would vary and should be driven, as it is argued by an 
understanding of the wider market (Bear et al., 2003). 
Among suggested roles are activities related to regula-
tion, information, research and standards. A particularly 
key role for government “is that of guardian of an 
enabling regulatory and legal framework”, without which; 
no business, large or small, will prosper (Torppa, 2006).  
 
 
Encourage more and higher quality evaluations of 
local economic development programmes that are 
undertaken by sub-national governments 
 
In the USA, it is argued a vital role for national govern-
ment is to support the development of ‘best practice’ in 
sub-national economic development programmes by 
encouraging more and better quality monitoring or eva-
luations of existing programmes. This analysis points to a 
need for improved evaluation methods. In the USA, it is 
stressed that “we need an evaluation methodology that is 
relatively cheap and can be used now on an ongoing 
basis, for state and local economic development 
programs to improve their performance” (Bartik, 1994: 
19). Overall, it is considered that surveys of business 
clients of economic development programmes offer the 
most feasible evaluation approach. 
 
 
Enhance urban competitiveness 
 
New research produced for the OECD affords a valuable 
synthesis of different options and opportunities for 
national government and local policy making in relation to 
building city competitiveness (Friedmann, 2007). A sharp 
divide exist between two different approaches to urban 
policy. 
The mainstream approach centres on cluster identi-
fication and support or the promotion of ‘creative cities’, 
‘creative classes’ or ‘knowledge-intensive’ activities 
(Markusen and Schrock, 2006; Andersson et al., 2011). 
This approach is premised upon recognizing that in an 





obliged to do their utmost to attract outside capital from 
investing in their region lest they fall behind in the game 
of global competition” (Friedmann, 2007: 81). Cities are 
considered like firms as having no option other than to 
compete fiercely as ‘entrepreneurial cities’ in the global 
‘sweepstakes’ to attract and retain capital. In enhancing 
competitiveness through cluster support programming, 
national or local policy makers need to be in a position to 
identify and subsequently to “map industry clusters, 
better understand their potentials and obstacles, and 
design and implement effective development policies” 
(OECD, 2006: 112). 
Once identified, the existing scholarship underlines 
there are no effective one-size fits all policies and a need 
exists for ‘tailor-made’ cluster development approaches. 
Such approaches, it is urged, require exploration of “the 
specific characteristics and capacities of individual areas 
in order to determine what is most likely to build and 
enhance their competitiveness” and correspondingly the 
competitiveness of specific cities (OECD, 2006: 115). 
The classic advantages identified for specialised clusters 
are that they afford various economies of scale “as well 
as the production of tacit and unformalized knowledge 
that flows among those engaged in related activities and 
in frequent work and social contact with one another 
(OECD, 2006: 106). Although most public support for 
clusters is provided by sub-national levels of government 
rather than by national government, exceptions are to be 
found in Denmark’s coordinated cluster policy for metro-
politan areas (OECD, 2006). Friedmann (2007) draws 
attention to support initiatives from national governments 
for cities to become global cities attracting headquarters 
of international corporations, of associated policies that 
emphasize favourable tax structures, investment 
incentives, attention attracting architecture, expensive 
infrastructure and the bidding for hosting mega-events 
such as the Olympic Games, World Expos or Soccer 
World Cup. In this approach, urban development and 
competitiveness is understood largely as a consequence 
of the attraction of “external inward-bound investment” 
(Friedmann, 2007: 81). 
A second less popular strategy for building compe-
titiveness is premised on the belief “that a better use of 
scarce resources would be investing in a region’s asset 
base for long-term development” (Friedmann, 2007: 81). 
This second approach, albeit not opposed to the attrac-
tion of in-bound capital, is essentially focussed upon 
laying a solid foundation for long-lasting development 
from within (Friedmann, 2007: 81). It is suggested that 
there are seven “clusters of such assets” which to varying 
degrees are present in all city-regions and that caring and 
investing in these assets should be the principal task for 
local government and with appropriate intervention by 
national government. It is asserted that “building assets 
by steadily investing in them will do more for long-term 
urban and regional development than soliciting invest-




seven assets for improvement relate to: (1) human assets 
(education, health, adequate housing, adequate mobility); 
(2) organised civil society which can be a source of 
strength in terms of everything from local churches, youth 
groups and sports teams; (3) local heritage of built 
environment and vibrancy of cultural life, including the 
development of heritage districts and cultural festivals; (4) 
intellectual and creative assets which relates to quality of 
local universities, research institutes, and local creative 
talent; (5) a city-regions’ natural assets in terms of basic 
resources such as lakes, beaches, forests, parks; (6) 
environmental assets which are closely related to natural 
assets but focus upon quality of air and water; and (7) 
quality of urban infrastructure, which relates to all 
facilities and equipment in respect of transport, energy, 




National intervention to support lagging or poor 
regions 
 
In the context of decentralization, there is an uneven 
playing field in terms of the capacities of individual states 
or localities to compete for or attract investment. The po-
litical rationale for decentralization focuses on achieving 
economic and social change. It is contended that 
decentralization “has been increasingly sold by powerful 
central elites, as well as a growing raft of nationalist and 
regionalist groups, as a way to attain greater efficiency 
and competitiveness and to achieve a better insertion into 
the globalised economy” (Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall, 
2008). In the developing world, several common argu-
ments provide the rationale for decentralization. Critically, 
in relation to Local Economic Development (LED), a vital 
advantage of decentralization pertains to “its capacity to 
mobilize underused resources and in the competition it 
creates among subnational governments in order to 
deliver better policies” (Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 
2009: 8-9).  
Arguably, a widely recognised consequence of the 
decentralization of responsibilities to state or local levels 
of government is reinforcement of geographical 
inequalities. Indeed, as the process of decentralization 
undermines the power of the national state to play an 
equalising role, it can lead to the transfer of economic 
development from the disadvantaged and poorer regions 
to the more prosperous (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 
2003a). For Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2003a, b), globali-
sation and the widespread transfer of power downwards 
from central government to regions and sub-national 
units is a critical factor in the observed rising levels of 
spatial inequalities. In particular, these authors powerfully 
suggest that: “by devolving power it is our contention that 
the redistributive role of (national) government is 
compromised, in favour of the operation of the market 
which, in  a  spatial  context,  is  likely  to  be  inequitable”  




(Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2003a: 29). One of the major 
disadvantages and consequences of devolution is thus 
seen as the linkage to rising levels of inequalities.  
Accordingly, as moves towards decentralization are 
often accompanied by increasing territorial inequalities, 
there is an important role for national governments to 
target policy support for economic development towards 
distressed areas or poorer regions. The international 
experience suggests this conclusion is particularly 
pertinent to low and middle-income countries where “the 
potential positive effects of political decentralization on 
cohesion will be easily counterbalanced by the unequal 
capacity of regions in the core and in the periphery of 
these countries to make the most of decentralized 
resources, especially in the absence of well-established 
territorially progressive fiscal systems” (Rodriguez-Pose 





It is apparent globally that the activity of local economic 
development “has continued to attract considerable 
governmental support and investment in recent years” 
(Haughton and Naylor, 2008: 167). Over the past decade, 
the rising importance of LED for development planning 
within Africa has been acknowledged and an 
accompanying new scholarship has crystallised around 
LED in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa (Helmsing, 
2003; Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra, 2007; Rogerson and 
Rogerson, 2010). The contribution made by this article 
was to re-examine the potential role that national govern-
ments can make towards directing and supporting local 
economic development and associated enterprise 
development. It is maintained that beyond the simple 
issuance of ‘guidelines’ for local economic development 
plans, national governments can push forward the 
advancement of LED agendas through a range of 
different kinds of support interventions. Arguably, among 
the 12 suggested areas of intervention for national 
governments, in the environment of sub-Saharan Africa, 
the most fundamental in energizing LED processes are 
those of improving the national business environment, 
reviewing national regulatory processes that impede local 
development initiatives, appropriate support for small 
business development, enhancing coordination across 
different government departments and strengthening the 
competiveness of cities, which are the major drivers of 
economic growth across all countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa. It is hoped that this modest analysis will trigger 
further discussion about the potential roles of national 
government in supporting sub-national development 
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